

The Fifth Empirical Accuracy Assessment of the OK-Score™ Model for the period 2000 - 2017

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Under supervision of

Het Effectenhuis Commissionairs at Amsterdam

and the external compliance officer

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# **SUMMARY**

The OK-Score<sup>™</sup> continues to prove a consistently accurate predictor of corporate failure and distress.

If anything, the accuracy of the model has increased in this, the fifth assessment of its reliability. Using empirical evidence, validated by The Supervision Committee, the Model is shown to have a 98.67% success rate of predicting business failure, up to 3 years in advance. This document details the methodology, classification and accuracy of W.D. Okkerse's credit rating system.

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 1st Edition:
 October 12, 2013
 (Period 2000 – 2012)

 2nd Revised edition:
 November 30, 2013
 (Period 2000 – 2013)

 3rd Revised edition:
 September 30, 2015
 (Period 2000 – 2015)

 4th Revised edition:
 February 28, 2017
 (Period 2000 – 2016)

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# INTRODUCTION

he OK-Score™ Model is a diagnostic tool that can be used for making credit risk assessments of a company. The input consists of the financial statements of a company, with a minimum of five consecutive fiscal years. The output is the **OK-Credit Score**™(1), resulting from a grid position of 81 potential positions to determine its **Material Migration Path**, its **Material Bias** and its **Strategic Options** for each fiscal year. The Model is a learning model, which means that the accuracy of the credit score improves with the number of imputed years: after five fiscal years, the OK-Score™ is considered reliable and is recognized as an official *OK-Score*™.

The OK-Score Model<sup>TM(2)</sup> has been developed by Mr. Willem Okkerse through a PhD program (1995-2000) at the University of Amsterdam, Quantitative Economics Department under the supervision of Professor Dr. Nico van Dijk. After the Model became operational in 2000, it has determined 2,930 OK-Scores<sup>(3)</sup> as per the end of 2017, in a mix of real life monitoring<sup>(4)</sup> and backtracking<sup>(5)</sup>. This population includes 75 situations of *Business Failures*<sup>(6)</sup>. The current accuracy assessment relates to the entire population of these 2,930 credit scores, and more specifically the 75 cases of *Business Failure*. All 75 *Business Failures* relate to the fiscal year ended 31 December 2017 or before.

<sup>(1)</sup> A credit score is a number that reflects the creditworthiness and vitality of a company.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(2)</sup>OK-Score™. The credit score based on the OK-Score Model™ that has been developed by Mr. W.D. Okkerse during a research PhD at University van Amsterdam in the years 1995 - 2000. OK-Scores are reported on a scale from 1 to 10, where Grade-1 is given to highly creditworthy and healthy companies and Grade-10 to companies facing a *Business Failure*.

<sup>(3)</sup>Input is monitored by both Het Effectenhuis Commissionairs BV and Emeritus Professor Dr. Chris Lefevbre (compliance supervision) and has been updated until 31 December 2017.

<sup>(4)</sup> Real life monitoring. The computation of an OK-Score™ over a recent period. The accuracy of the credit score cannot be assessed if the rating period is of insufficient substance. (Minimum 4 years). Real time monitoring is usually performed as a part of the global monitoring of an organization by shareholders, bondholders or credit suppliers.

<sup>(5)</sup> Backtracking (also: back testing). The computation of a credit score over a period, lying in the past. After computing the credit score it can be compared directly to real life developments since. Example: today credit scores could be computed for Enron over the five years' period (1996 - 2000) preceding its Business Failure (2001). With hindsight one can then assess whether these credit scores reflect the increased risk timely and accurately.

<sup>(6)</sup> Business Failure. The situation of Default, Chapter 11 or bankruptcy or strong measures such as Asset Stripping, Forced Recapitalization, Turnaround, or Forced Take-over, in combination with a substantial decline in stock prices of the company. Such strong measures are the responsibility of the Executive and Supervisory Board and they are usually forced on a company by the shareholders and other stakeholders. A timely warning will be of the greatest importance. The OK-Score™ model warns up to three or four years in advance. The substantial decline of the stock price that coincides with most Business Failure can cause serious damage to the share/bondholders and other stakeholders. In some cases, fraud can be identified as the main cause of the Business Failure as many accounting scandals have shown.

# **METHODOLOGY**

he OK-Score™ Model requires input from the financial statements of five (minimum) consecutive financial years: balance sheet, profit and loss account, cash-flow statement. The Model determines a credit score for every single year, but only from the fifth fiscal year, can this credit score be considered a valid OK-Score™. The Model is a learning model, which means that the reliability of the annual credit scores improves up to and including the fifth year. Due to the OK-Score′s™ forecasting quality over two to three years, any backtracking period must be five years, to which, inevitably, the three years for the forecasting period should also be added, in order to compare this forecasting with the real-life outcome.

The OK-Score™ analysis is based upon 125 input fields, 25 per fiscal year and will deliver, alongside a variety of normal Business Ratios, two specific OK-Score™ ratios. The first ratio is the OK-Solvency™, a modified version of the solvency ratio which is divided into 9 classes. The best class (1) consists of companies with an OK-Solvency from 100-49%. The next classes (2-8) have a 49-0% solvency, divided in 7% intervals. The weakest class (9) consists of companies with a negative shareholders' equity. The second ratio is the OK-Ratio™, based on an in-depth analysis of the five consecutive financial statements and is also divided into 9 classes. The best classes (1-2) have positive ratios of [<1 to 0.5) and [<0.5 to 0] respectively. The next classes (3-9) have negative ratios: [-1] [-2] [-4] [-16] [-256] [-65536]. Any OK-Score will be derived from the position on the 9x9 grid of both the OK-Score™ Solvency and the OK-Score™ Ratio. The model can be applied to all sorts of enterprises, except financial institutions and real estate companies. The main reason is that the structure of the financial statements of companies in these industries is very different.

The OK-Score<sup>m</sup> is derived from the 81 possible grid combinations of OK-Solvency<sup>m</sup> and OK-Ratio<sup>m</sup> (9 x 9). Each of them is part of the Material Migration Path, a method to define potential disintegrating or improving strategic choices, since each grid position is linked to twelve internationally recognized "Grand Strategies"<sup>(7)</sup>.

| 9 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 8 | 9  | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 7 | 8  | 9  | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 6 | 7  | 8  | 9  | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 5 | 6  | 7  | 8  | 9  | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 4 | 5  | 6  | 7  | 8  | 9  | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 3 | 4  | 5  | 6  | 7  | 8  | 9  | 10 | 10 |
| 2 | 3  | 4  | 5  | 6  | 7  | 8  | 9  | 10 |
| 1 | 2  | 3  | 4  | 5  | 6  | 7  | 8  | 9  |

OK-Solvency™

Innovation - Conglomerate Diversification - Horizontal Integration - Vertical Integration - Concentric Diversification - Product Development - Market Development - Strategical Alliances - Concentration - Turn Around - Divestiture - Liquidation

<sup>(7)</sup>Twelve Grand Strategies (Pearce & Robinson 1990 etc.)

# **CLASSIFICATION**

#### 3.1 OK-Score Classes

n OK-Score™ Grade-1 stands for perfect certainty about creditworthiness and health. An OK-Score™ Grade-10 warns of Business Failure. This can be analyzed as follows:

| OK-SCORE | STANDARD<br>RATING | MEANING  |
|----------|--------------------|--|
| 1        | AAA                | Almost perfect security. Very large capacity for expansion, also with borrowed capital. All strategies possible.   |
| 2        | AA                 | Excellent security. Large capacity for expansion, also with borrowed capital. All strategies possible.   |
| 3        | А                  | Solid security. Capacity for expansion, also with borrowed capital.  All strategies possible.  |
| 4        | ВВВ                | Good security. Potential for expansion, also with borrowed capital.  Only 5 offensive strategies possible.   |
| 5        | ВВ                 | Normal security. Some potential for expansion, however be watchful of expansion with borrowed capital. Only 5 offensive strategies possible.   |
| 6        | В                  | Moderate security. Improvements desirable. Expansion with borrowed capital not wise. Three remaining offensive strategies.   |
| 7        | ссс                | Inadequate security. Improvements necessary. Expansion with borrowed capital strongly discouraged. Three remaining offensive strategies.   |
| 8        | сс                 | Worrying security. Improvements needed urgently. Expansion with borrowed capital could be fatal. Only three remaining, now defensive strategies.   |
| 9        | С                  | Hazardous situations. Substantial improvements needed by return.<br>Expansion with borrowed capital not possible. Starting platform for either<br>Turn Around or Business Failure.   |
| 10       | D                  | Depending on the grid-situation, immediate actions required: either Turn Around, Divestiture (Asset Stripping) or Recapitalization. Otherwise default, Chapter 11, bankruptcy, or state support within one to three years. |

Companies with an OK-Solvency<sup>™</sup> of >49% won't automatically obtain a OK-Score<sup>™</sup> Class ONE. Several companies (such as WorldCom, Lernhout & Hauspie, Tulip) had a top solvency ratio (>49%) in combination with an OK-Ratio Grade-9. The final judgement must always be based on the combination of the OK-Solvency<sup>™</sup>, the OK-Ratio<sup>™</sup> and its **Migration Path.** 

### 3.2 Material Migration Path

It stands to reason that the annual grid positions 1.1 - 9.9 and their annual migration by themselves are **a major indication of improving or deteriorating business processes.** Combined with the strategic options, it will answer any question in relation to the effectiveness of any used or intended strategy by its Board of Directors.

### 3.3 Strategic Options

**Diagram of strategic options by investment capacity and order of organizational complexity.** (Low = x and High = xxxxxx). These twelve Grand Strategies are in common use all over the world and consist of:

|     |                              | AVAILABILITY<br>OF FUNDS | ORGANIZATIONAL<br>COMPLEXITY |
|-----|------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1.  | Innovation                   | •••••                    | •••••                        |
| 2.  | Conglomerate Diversification | ••••                     | ••••                         |
| 3.  | Horizontal Integration       | ••••                     | ••••                         |
| 4.  | Vertical Integration         | ••••                     | ••••                         |
| 5.  | Concentric Diversification   | •••                      | ••••                         |
| 6.  | Product Development          | ••••                     | •••                          |
| 7.  | Market Development           | ••                       | ••                           |
| 8.  | Strategical Alliances        | ••                       | ••                           |
| 9.  | Concentration                | •                        | •••                          |
| 10. | Turn Around                  | •                        | •••                          |
| 11. | Divestiture                  | •                        | ••                           |
| 12. | Liquidation                  | •                        | •                            |

### 3.4 Material Bias

While determining the credit scores, the OK-Score<sup>™</sup> Model will also flag any amounts of value in the financial statements that do not make sense. The sum of these values is identified as *Material Bias* or *NOT ACCOUNTED FOR*.

If the Material Bias is substantial and the OK-Score<sup>TM</sup> is 7 or worse, immediate investigation is required. It appears from our assessments so far, that in many cases this can be explained by manipulation of the financial statements and/or another material fraud.

#### 3.5 Fraud

**The Business Failures Database** contains 2,930 credit scores determined in the period 2000 - 2017 (closing date: 31 December 2017). It contains several cases (via real life monitoring or backtracking) where fraud was involved. The Model has flagged all these frauds at least one year before they came out in the media. The Model flags fraud via the item Material Bias (see previous section).

In the enclosed *Business Failures Database*, the various cases of **corporate fraud** have been marked **R** Moulinex, LCI and Enron (2001), WorldCom and **Ahold** (February 2002), Landis (2003), Parmalat (2004), Imtech (2013), Abengoa (2015) and Valeant (2016) and Weyl (2017). There have been some other cases of corporate fraud during these years, but these companies were not monitored by the OK-Score™ and hence were not included In the *Business Failures Database*.

# **ACCOUNTABILITY**

he ability to reproduce research results is a cornerstone of scientific research. Since the OK-Score™ Model became operational in the year 2000, regulators, scientists and journalists have had and always will have the opportunity to verify every public OK-Score™. The following conditions apply to all OK-Scores™ that are included in the published statistics:

- a) Real life monitoring: the OK-Score<sup>™</sup> can be reproduced<sup>(8)</sup> and compared to the real events;
- **b)** Backtracking: the OK-Score<sup>™</sup> can be reproduced and the backtracking is normally performed under the supervision of qualified external parties.

<sup>(8)</sup> Reproduction. The re-computation of an OK-Score™ by using the same information as in the past. If one can determine that the OK-Score™ Model is unchanged (via hash totals of other checks), one can assess whether the first OK-Score™ had been computed correctly. Reproduction is normally always performed in the presence of another person than the analyst. Reproduction can be real time (self-control, internal control etc.) or via backtracking (regulatory compliance, due diligence etc.)

# **ACCURACY**

#### **5.1 Portfolio**

fter the OK-Score™ Model became operational in 2000, it has warned of 74 out of 75 (98.67%)

\*\*Business Failures\*\* that have occurred in the portfolio by giving an OK-Score™ class 10. The remaining 1 (1.33%) was identified with an OK-Score™ class 9. Both classes imply that investing in shares or bonds should be prohibited.

Since the model became operational, 2,930 credit scores (as of 31 December 2017) have been computed by the Model, a mix of backtracking and real live monitoring. This population included 75 *Business Failures*, and 2,855 *non-Business Failures*.

#### **5.2 Errors**

Type 1 - The likelihood that a valid and running company will receive an OK-Score<sup>™</sup> 10 = 1/2854 or 0.035%.


Type 2 - The likelihood that a Business Failure company will not receive an OK-Score<sup>TM</sup> 10 in the three previous years before the event = 1/75 = 1.33%.

The likelihood that an OK-Score 10 will not lead to a *Business Failure* within three years = 1.33%, however:

The likelihood that a Business Failure company will not receive an OK-Score™ 9 or 10 is ZERO %

### **5.3 Cumulative Accuracy Profile**(9)

The reliability of a credit score or a credit rating can also be expressed with the Cumulative Accuracy Profile (CAP), using the so-called **GINI coefficient** which is based on the Lorenz-curve. The 3-year Lorenz-curve for the OK-Score™ Model is as follows.



#### **5.4 Gini-coefficient**

The Gini-coefficient of the OK-Score<sup>™</sup> Model **(GREEN LINE)** is 98.6% which can be analyzed as follows: 100% minus 1.4% (Type-2 error) minus 0.04% (Type-1 error). It corresponds to the area above the curve divided by the area between the Lorenz-curve and the 45° line (the random curve). As can also be seen from the graph, the CAP of the OK-Score<sup>™</sup> Model is following, almost exactly, the ideal curve; if we compare it to the CAP of credit rating agencies or audit firms, we see substantial differences.

The S&P line has been marked with red dots, thus indicating the tremendous improvement by the OK-Score model, viz. the complete area between the red dotted line and the green line.

Credit Rating agencies (CRA) predict default. Audit firms predict going concern issues. The OK-Score™ Model predicts *Business Failure* which is a broader concept. Credit rating agencies and audit firms predict 1-year default and 1-year going concern issues respectively. The OK-Score™ Model has chosen the term that suits the model best: 3 years. This term is also more valuable to stakeholders than the 1-year term that is mandatory for CRA and audit firms.

<sup>(9)</sup> The cumulative Accuracy Profile is determined by the Lorenz curve and is calculated as follows. The horizontal axis (X) shows the cumulative number of credit-scores as a percentage from 0 - 100%. The vertical axis (Y) shows, counting from the center the cumulative amount of Business Failures also as a percentage, Also counting from the center it starts with the poorest OK-Scores (Class 10) on the Y-axis. The curve shows in which zone of the credit scores ALL Business Failures can be found.



### **ANNEXES**

#### 6.1 Portfolio of real life Monitoring and Back Tracking and Errors

### **Business Failures Database and legend**

his database contains 2,930 credit scores as per that date. In the annex, we only mention the *Business Failures*. The *Business Failures Database* shows all *Business Failures* and all Grade-10 OK-Scores™ that can be reproduced and that have been issued in the period 2000-2017 (closing date 31 December 2017). Within that period (2000 - 2017) we assessed 75 OK-Score™ of Class 10. From these 75 potential *Business Failures*, 74 encountered a real *Business Failures*. These are classified as follows:

#### 6.2 Legend

| AS | = | Asset Stripping            | = | 16%                                   |
|----|---|----------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|
| В  | = | Bankruptcy                 | = | 28% incl. 1% Chapter 11 and 18% Fraud |
| СН | = | Chapter 11                 | = | 0                                     |
| FR | = | Fraud                      | = | 18% of which 15% ended in Bankruptcy  |
| FS | = | Forced Sale of the company | = | 04%                                   |
| LC | = | Litigation claim           | = | 03%                                   |
| R  | = | Forced Recapitalization    | = | 40%                                   |
| SS | = | States Support             | = | 03%                                   |
| TA | = | Turn Around                | = | 05%                                   |

Within the period 2000 - 2017, we assessed 2,855 OK-Score<sup>™</sup> Classes better than OK-Score<sup>™</sup> class 10. From these 2,855 potential going concern companies, 1 enterprise (a prediction in 1999) went bankrupt with an indicative OK-Score<sup>™</sup> of Class 9. However, none of the other 2,854 failed.

During 2017, we assessed 188 companies. Ten of them received a business failure warning. Seven of them are already registered in our enclosed database. Three of them are indicated as future **Business** *Failures* All three of them are registered separately with our compliance officers and will be added to the database at the end of their three-year prediction time or at the moment the prediction becomes a reality. If not, obviously it will be recorded as an OK-Score™ failure. Since 2016, the additional 2017 figures have improved the reliability of the OK-Score™ as follows:

Type 1 - The likelihood that a valid and running company will receive an OK-Score™ 10 = 1/2854 or 0.035% (was 0.04%)

Type 2 - The likelihood that a *Business Failure* company will not receive an OK-Score<sup>™</sup>10 in the three previous years before the event = 1/75 = 1.33% (was 1.43%)

The likelihood that an OK-Score™ 10 does not lead to a *Business Failure* within three years = 1.33% (was 1.43%)

### **Finally**

The likelihood that a *Business Failure* company will not receive an OK-Score™ 9 or 10 is ZERO %.

| Nr. | Name                         | Country       | OK-SCOPE 10  | REAL LIFE/BACKTR | DESIIIT                            | YEAR         | RESULT         | YEAR | REMARKS | SUPERVISOR                         |
|-----|------------------------------|---------------|--------------|------------------|------------------------------------|--------------|----------------|------|---------|------------------------------------|
|     | 1 MOULINEX                   | FR            | 1999         | BT BT            | FORCED RECAP                       | 2000         | BANKRUPT       | 2001 | FRAUD   | ABP                                |
|     | 2 LCI                        | NL            | 1999         | ВТ               | FORCED RECAP                       | 2000         | BANKRUPT       | 2001 | FRAUD   | VEB                                |
|     | 3 NUMICO                     | NL            | 1999         | BT               | ASSET STRIPPING                    | 2001         |                |      |         | AUDITOR                            |
|     | 4 ENRON                      | USA           | 2000         | ВТ               | BANKRUPT                           | 2001         |                |      | FRAUD   | FD                                 |
|     | 5 PARMALAT                   | IT            | 2002         | ВТ               | BANKRUPT                           | 2003         |                |      | FRAUD   | NRC                                |
|     | 6 LAURUS<br>7 NESCHEN        | NL<br>GER     | 2003<br>2003 | BT<br>BT         | FORCED RECAP<br>FORCED RECAP       | 2004<br>2004 | FORCED SALE    | 2005 |         | LAURUS<br>EVERLING                 |
|     | 8 VILENZO                    | NL            | 2003         | ВТ               | BANKRUPT                           | 2004         |                |      | FRAUD   | CURATOR                            |
|     | 9 LOCKHEED                   | USA           | 2003         | BT               | STATE SUPPORT                      | 2004         |                |      | FRAUD   | DUBASH                             |
|     | 0 COMCAST                    | USA           | 2004         | ВТ               | LITIGATION CLAIM                   | 2005         |                |      |         | DUBASH                             |
| 1   | 1 COMCAST                    | USA           | 2007         | ВТ               | LITIGATION CLAIM                   | 2008         |                |      |         | DUBASH                             |
|     | 2 FORD                       | USA           | 2004         | ВТ               | STATE SUPPORT                      | 2005         |                |      |         | DUBASH                             |
|     | 3 ASR                        | BEL           | 2005         | ВТ               | BANKRUPT                           | 2006         |                |      | FRAUD   | TRIFORENSIC                        |
|     | 4 ANONYMOUS                  | NL            | 2008         | ВТ               | BANKRUPT                           | 2009         |                |      |         | PWC                                |
|     | 5 ANONYMUS<br>6 ANONYMUS     | NL<br>NL      | 2008<br>2008 | BT<br>BT         | BANKRUPT<br>BANKRUPT               | 2009<br>2009 |                |      |         | PWC<br>PWC                         |
|     | 7 ANONYMUS                   | NI            | 2008         | BT               | BANKRUPT                           | 2009         |                |      |         | PWC                                |
|     | 8 SPRINT                     | NI            | 2007         | BT.              | FORCED RECAP                       | 2008         |                |      |         | DUBASH                             |
| 1   | 9 WAEYERHAUSER               | USA           | 2008         | BT               | FORCED RECAP                       | 2010         |                |      |         | DUBASH                             |
| 2   | 0 CATERPILLAR                | USA           | 2009         | BT               | FORCED RECAP                       | 2010         |                |      |         | DUBASH                             |
|     | 1 ÈASTMAN KODAK              | USA           | 2009         | ВТ               | CHAPT 11                           | 2012         | BANKRUPT       | 2013 |         | DUBASH                             |
|     | 2 LANDIS                     | NL            | 2000         | RL               | BANKRUPT                           | 2002         |                |      |         | RIENK KAMER                        |
|     | 3 GETRONICS                  | NL            | 2000         | RL               | ASSET STRIPPING                    | 2001         | FORCED RECAP   | 2003 |         | TO DAY'S BEHEER                    |
|     | 4 GETRONICS                  | NL            | 2004         | RL               | FORCED SALE                        | 2007         |                |      |         | TO DAY'S BEHEER                    |
|     | 5 UNILEVER<br>6 AHOLD        | NL<br>NL      | 2000<br>2000 | RL<br>RL         | TURN AROUND<br>FORCED RECAP        | 2001<br>2001 | FORCED RECAP   | 2002 | FRAUD   | TO DAY'S BEHEER<br>TO DAY'S BEHEER |
|     | 7 AHOLD                      | NL<br>NL      | 2004         | RL<br>RL         | ASSET STRIPPING                    | 2001         | FURCED RECAP   | 2003 | FRAUD   | TO DAY'S BEHEER                    |
|     | 8 WOLTERS KLUWER             | NI            | 2004         | RL RL            | ASSET STRIPPING                    | 2003         |                |      |         | TO DAY'S BEHEER                    |
|     | 9 WOLTERS KLUWER             | NL            | 2004         | RL               | FORCED RECAP                       | 2005         |                |      |         | TO DAY'S BEHEER                    |
|     | 0 WOLTERS KLUWER             | NL            | 2006         | RL               | FORCED RECAP                       | 2007         |                |      |         | TO DAY'S BEHEER                    |
| 3   | 1 KPN                        | NL            | 2001         | RL               | FORCED RECAP                       | 2003         |                |      |         | TO DAY'S BEHEER                    |
|     | 2 ASML                       | NL            | 2001         | RL               | FORCED RECAP                       | 2004         |                |      |         | TO DAY'S BEHEER                    |
|     | 3 NUMICO                     | NL            | 2002         | RL               | ASSET STRIPPING                    | 2003         |                |      |         | TO DAY'S BEHEER                    |
|     | 4 NUMICO<br>5 SBM            | NL<br>NI      | 2004         | RL<br>RL         | FORCED RECAP                       | 2005         | FORCED SALE    | 2007 |         | TO DAY'S BEHEER                    |
|     | 6 SBM                        | NL<br>NL      | 2004         | RL<br>RL         | FORCED RECAP<br>FORCED RECAP       | 2005         |                |      | FRAUD   | TO DAY'S BEHEER<br>EFFECTENHUIS    |
|     | 7 INNOCONCEPTS               | NL            | 2009         | RL               | BANKRUPT                           | 2013         |                |      | FRAUD   | UNIVERSITY                         |
|     | 8 AIR BERLIN                 | GER           | 2009         | RL               | FORCED RECAP                       | 2012         |                |      | TRAUD   | EFFECTENHUIS                       |
|     | 9 ABENGOA                    | SPAIN         | 2010         | RL               | FORCED RECAP                       | 2012         | BANKRUPT       | 2015 | FRAUD   | EFFECTENHUIS                       |
| 4   | 0 NORSKE SKOG                | NOR           | 2011         | RL               | ASSET STRIPPING                    | 2012         | ASSET STRIPPIN | 2013 |         | EFFECTENHUIS                       |
|     | 1 PRAKTIKER                  | GER           | 2011         | RL               | BANKRUPT                           | 2013         |                |      |         | EFFECTENHUIS                       |
|     | 2 ALPINE                     | AUSTRIA       | 2012         | RL               | BANKRUPT                           | 2013         |                |      |         | EFFECTENHUIS                       |
|     | 3 AIRFRANCE                  | FR            | 2012         | RL               | FORCED RECAP                       | 2013         |                |      |         | EFFECTENHUIS                       |
|     | 4 PORR<br>5 IMTECH           | AUSTRIA<br>NL | 2012<br>2012 | RL<br>RL         | FORCED RECAP                       | 2013<br>2013 | BANKRUPT       | 2015 | FRAUD   | EFFECTENHUIS<br>EFFECTENHUIS       |
|     | 6 WORLDCOM                   | USA           | 1999         | BT               | BANKRUPT                           | 2013         | OK-CLASS 9     | 2015 | FRAUD   | UNIVERSITY                         |
|     | 7 GRONTMIJ                   | NI            | 2012         | RL RL            | FORCED RECAP                       | 2013         | FORCED SALE    | 2015 | TRACE   | EFFECTENHUIS                       |
| 4   | 8 BAM                        | NL            | 2010         | RL               | FORCED RECAP                       | 2011         |                |      |         | EFFECTENHUIS                       |
| 4   | 9 ALCATEL                    | FR            | 2011         | RL               | FORCED SALE                        | 2013         | FORCED SALE    | 2014 |         | ERH                                |
|     | 0 SCHOLTZ                    | GER           | 2012         | RL               | ASSET STRIPPING                    | 2013         |                |      |         | EFFECTENHUIS                       |
|     | 1 NEW WORLD                  | POL           | 2013         | RL               | FORCED RECAP                       | 2014         |                |      |         | EFFECTENHUIS                       |
|     | 2 SIEM OFFSHORE              | NOR           | 2011         | RL               | FORCED RECAP                       | 2012         |                |      |         | EFFECTENHUIS                       |
|     | 3 BAM                        | NL            | 2012<br>2013 | RL<br>RL         | FORCED RECAP                       | 2013<br>2014 |                |      |         | EFFECTENHUIS<br>FRH                |
|     | 4 WESSANEN<br>5 GOLDEN OCEAN | NL<br>BMD     | 2013<br>2012 | RL<br>RL         | ASSET STRIPPING<br>ASSET STRIPPING | 2014<br>2013 | FORCED SALE    | 2014 |         | ERH<br>EFFECTENHUIS                |
|     | 6 WEYI                       | NI            | 2005         | BT               | ASSET STRIPPING                    | 2013         | BANKRUPT       | 2008 | FRAUD   | EFFECTENHUIS                       |
|     | 7 BAM                        | NL            | 2014         | RL               | FORCED SALE                        | 2015         | 52             | 2000 | TRACE   | ERH                                |
|     | 8 AMG                        | NL            | 2013         | RL               | ASSET STRIPPING                    | 2014         |                |      |         | ERH                                |
| 5   | 9 PNE WIND                   | GER           | 2013         | RL               | FORCED RECAP                       | 2014         |                |      |         | EFFECTENHUIS                       |
|     | 0 WOLTERS KLUWER             | NL            | 2009         | RL               | NO BUSINESS FAILURE                |              |                |      |         | TO DAY'S BEHEER                    |
| -   | 1 VEDES                      | GER           | 2013         | RL               | FORCED RECAP                       | 2014         |                |      |         | EFFECTENHUIS                       |
|     | 2 AIR FRANCE<br>3 HEIJMANS   | FR<br>NI      | 2014<br>2014 | RL<br>RL         | FORCED RECAP                       | 2015<br>2015 |                |      |         | EFFECTENHUIS<br>FEFECTENHUIS       |
|     | 4 VALEANT                    | USA           | 2014         | RL<br>RL         | ASSET STRIPPING                    | 2015         |                |      |         | EFFECTENHUIS                       |
|     | 5 TULLOW OIL                 | USA           | 2013         | RL<br>RL         | FORCED RECAP                       | 2016         |                |      |         | EFFECTENHUIS                       |
|     | 6 VALLOUREC                  | FR            | 2014         | RL               | FORCED RECAP                       | 2016         |                |      |         | EFFECTENHUIS                       |
|     | 7 UNDERBERG                  | GER           | 2013         | RL               | FORCED RECAP                       | 2014         |                |      |         | EFFECTENHUIS                       |
|     | 8 OAD                        | NL            | 2012         | ВТ               | BANKRUPT                           | 2013         |                |      | FRAUD   | PWC                                |
|     | 9 RICKMERS                   | GER           | 2011         | RL               | FORCED RECAP                       | 2013         | BANKRUPT       | 2017 |         | EFFECTENHUIS                       |
|     | 0 HELLENIC                   | GREECE        | 2013         | RL               | TURN AROUND                        | 2014         |                |      |         | EFFECTENHUIS                       |
|     | 1 TESCO                      | UK            | 2016         | RL               | TURN AROUND                        | 2017         |                |      |         | EFFECTENHUIS                       |
|     | 2 BOURBON                    | FR            | 2016         | RL               | TURN AROUND                        | 2017         |                |      |         | EFFECTENHUIS                       |
|     | 3 APACHE<br>4 TESLA          | USA           | 2016<br>2016 | RL<br>RL         | ASSET STRIPPING<br>FORCED RECAP    | 2017<br>2017 |                |      |         | EFFECTENHUIS<br>EFFECTENHUIS       |
|     | 5 NYRSTAR                    | BEL           | 2016         | RL RL            | FORCED RECAP                       | 2017         |                |      |         | EFFECTENHUIS                       |
|     |                              |               |              |                  | - =:::                             |              |                |      |         | = =                                |